Experimentation and Learning in Policy Implementation: Implications for Public Management by Eppel, Elizabeth et al.
Experimentation and Learning in Policy 
Implementation: Implications for Public 
Management 
 
Elizabeth Eppel, David Turner  
and Amanda Wolf 
 
 
 
Institute of Policy Studies 
 
Working Paper 11/04 
 
June 2011  
 
 
 
INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES 
WORKING PAPER 
11/04 
 
 
MONTH/YEAR 
 
  AUTHORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2011 
  
Elizabeth Eppel, David Turner and Amanda Wolf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was commissioned as part of the Future 
State  project  under  the  Emerging  Issues  Pro-
gramme. The authors would like to thank members 
of the departmental reference group for the useful 
discussions and the helpful comments that were 
received on the draft paper.  Thanks are also due to 
the interview and focus group participants and other 
members of the Future State project team for their 
respective contributions.  The views contained in 
this paper are those of the authors alone. 
 
School of Government 
Victoria University of Wellington 
PO Box 600 
Wellington 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
Email:  ips@vuw.ac.nz 
Website www.ips.ac.nz 
 
 
The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this paper are 
strictly those of the authors. They do not  
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of  
Policy Studies, the School of Government or Victo-
ria University of Wellington.  
 
 
 
Future State 2 - Working Paper 11/04 
  
Future State 2 is a research project being undertaken on behalf of state services chief executives as 
part of the Emerging Issues Programme (EIP). The project aims to identify how the ‘centre’ can 
support new ways of working that are required for the public sector to respond effectively to 
emerging complex problems, and how individual agencies could promote new ways of working. 
There are several strands to this work: 1) international perspectives, 2) emerging trends in 
governance, 3) joint accountability, 4) experimentation and learning in policy implementation, 5) 
agency restructuring, 6) skills and capabilities, and 7) the authorising environment. 
 
 
Abstract 
Policy objectives often can be simply stated. Yet, policy implementation frequently becomes 
complex, not only when the problem addressed is complex or wicked, such as family violence 
prevention, but also when the policy is simply stated, such as raising the GST. In complex 
implementation, effective organisational and individual practices facilitate learning by 
experimentation. Practices centre on detecting anomalies and then explicitly incorporating 
reflections on them in ongoing design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation activities. The 
research drew on policy and experimentation literature to propose a new framework for describing 
complex implementation practices, a range of cases studies, and discussions with policy managers. 
Findings highlight the need for a consistent strategic view of end goals, some means for testing 
changes, and the capacity to identify and assess results in order to redirect effort. Support for these 
practices involves ensuring appropriate permission to experiment, early and sustained activity 
conducted outside the responsible agencies, and open access to multiple sources of expertise. 
Implementing agencies and the policy management system need to take every opportunity to fully 
incorporate learning into their understanding of the agency’s role, capability requirements, and 
future focus. 
 
Introduction and research aims  
This research sought fresh perspectives on implementation activities, particularly in complex 
situations. Policy implementation describes the set of activities between a government decision to 
initiate or change a given policy intervention and the observation of outcomes. Practitioners know, 
however, that the boundaries are often blurred between policy design, implementation and 
detection of outcomes. Academic research and evidence from New Zealand indicated a need to 
augment simple and linear models of the policy process with explicit practices based on an iterative 
experimental-learning process when dealing with complex implementation situations. Initial 
evidence suggested that activities evolve to suit new information from the implementation field and 
necessarily involve actors outside the government agencies responsible for the policy. Policy design 
and implementation are co-produced along with policy outcomes, with evaluative learning 
marshalling that process. Accordingly, this research set out to investigate the public management 
implications of implementation practices, guided by two aims:  
 
 
 
 
 
(1) To identify organisational and individual practices that promote more effective policy 
implementation, facilitating learning by experimentation. 
 
(2) To identify practices that capture knowledge about complex implementation and maintain it 
institutionally. 
 
It further sought to identify lessons that address a broader question: 
 
(3) What can the centre do to support policy implementation in the constantly changing ‘real-
world’?  
 
This research adds to the understanding of how public sector agencies operate effectively in 
conditions where there are wicked problems and multiple perspectives on their causes and 
solutions. Attention deliberately shifts from ex ante efforts to logically link policy design and 
interventions to consequent outcomes to alternative ways of thinking about and ‘doing’ policy.  This 
shift in focus sets the stage for a series of specific suggestions to be considered at different levels, 
including Parliament and select committees, cabinet, chief executives and senior departmental 
leaderships, leadership collectives, and the central control agencies.  
 
 
Evidence base  
The research built on public management literature that identifies organisational and individual 
practices that promote more effective policy implementation when dealing with complex situations, 
previous New Zealand public management research findings, and new discussions with policy 
managers from a range of public agencies. 
Literature 
International public management literature dealing with the policy processes involving complexity in 
implementation and wicked problems provided an initial orientation to the research. The themes 
from the literature included complexity as it applies to policy processes, experimentation in policy 
implementation and pragmatism.  
 
Among the implications of complexity is that no one person or organisation has sufficient 
information or resources to understand and solve complex or wicked problems (Klijn, 1996; Ritter 
and Webber, 1973), including policy implementation problems. At the heart of many policy 
processes lies a marriage of appropriate means (people, perspectives, influence, and resources) to 
understand the reality of a problem and to address it, along with an understanding of social 
complexity as it affects human societies and organisations. As with any complex system:  
  
change, instability and non-equilibrium are the norm . . . . the path of change can be highly 
sensitive to initial conditions. . . . traditional cause-effect assumptions cease to be valid; 
elements of systems are mutually dependent. . . in effect the behaviour of a complex system 
emerges as the holistic sum of the dynamic interaction between its component parts over 
time. (Sanderson, 2009, pp. 705–6) 
Appendix 1 provides a summary of the features of complex systems as they may apply to policy 
processes. 
 
 
 
 
A view of policy as a form of experimentation has been extensively developed in the literature 
(DeHue, 2001; Dunn, 1998; Pawson, 2006; Sanderson, 2009), reflecting an understanding of policy as 
fluid, ambiguous and emergent, with implications for implementation. It is suggested that one 
doesn’t simply ‘dive in’ to learn in a new situation (Stoker and John, 2009). Instead one treats 
systems of joint activity as experiments through “speculatively defined ideals” used as hypotheses 
which are tried out in practical life (Haworth, 1960, p. 35). The theme of treating policy as social 
experiment (Dunn, 1998) is mirrored in practices than seek to diverge from pure randomised 
experiment trials in order to learn better from the everyday complexities (Oxman et al., 2009). 
Others offer overviews of practices based on recently crafted ideas of ‘design thinking’ (Baerenholdt 
et al., 2010).   
 
Finally, the literatures examined reveal a common orientation to practice strategies that derives—in 
essence, if not always plainly and directly—from pragmatism. Pragmatic thinking supports revelation 
of the ‘truth’ of real-world problems from many actors’ perspectives. Sanderson (2009) explicitly 
draws on pragmatism to define ‘intelligent’ policy making, based on accommodating complexity, 
testing policies in practice, evaluating rigorously, and applying what is learned to future policy 
thinking and decisions. (Appendix 2 provides an overview of pragmatism.) 
Case studies 
Four New Zealand cases illustrated the themes of pragmatism and complexity at work in public 
policy processes and led to the designation of some initial propositions about the characteristics of 
complex implementation. The four cases provided some common insights into instances of complex 
implementation, even though their substantive contexts differed.  
 
In the first case (Eppel, 2010), the creation of the Tertiary Education Commission was shown to be 
based on an apparently simple idea—that creating a new government agency could serve to steer 
the whole of the tertiary education sector such that the research and education outputs of tertiary 
education funded by government were more aligned to New Zealand’s economic and labour market 
needs. The implementation of this idea proved complex because much of the information needed to 
understand the change required was dispersed in individual organisations. Furthermore, as the 
policy was implemented, these organisations continued to adapt and co-evolve with the policies 
being implemented. This resulted in the emergence of new and completely unexpected phenomena 
which had not been present or considered at the time the policy was designed.   
 
The second case examined the Land and Water Forum (Bisley, 2010a, 2010b). The Forum, pursuing a 
collaborative governance approach that was relatively unknown and untested in New Zealand, 
created a policy framework for water use in an area where policy progress had previously been 
stalled. The approach allowed multiple perspectives to be taken into account and competing values 
and priorities to be balanced. The third case, Schooling Effectiveness in Mangere and Otara (Eppel, 
Gill, Lips, & Ryan, 2008; Phillips, McNaughton, & MacDonald, 2002; Robinson & Timperley, 2004) 
examined responses to the problem of improving education outcomes in a large number of south 
Auckland schools. The problem was addressed with the resources of the schools and their 
communities, as well as the technical expertise and research data held by the Ministry of Education. 
A shared vision across all actors was used to lead effective change in which novel approaches were 
developed in partnership with the schools. Finally, in the fourth case (McLaren & Stone, 2010), the 
Family Violence Prevention Campaign was considered as an exemplar of a ‘community study’ 
approach to learning about a policy situation. In this case, family violence prevention activities were 
constructed by leveraging community knowledge and resources. A relatively simple idea, ‘It’s not 
OK’, was used to build a shared understanding of the problem in communities and motivate local 
action. Evaluating such a complex implementation was also shown to require taking account of the 
 
 
 
complexity of the implementation. Detailed information on these case studies is available on http:// 
ips.ac.nz/events/completedactivities/Emerging%20Issues%20Programme/Future%20State.html.  
 
Interview and focus group discussions 
Policy practitioners were provided an overview of lessons drawn from the four case studies, and 
asked to describe their own complex implementation experiences with the aid of diagrams 
contrasting policy practices that were developed for the purpose (described below). Interviewees 
came from diverse sectors: education, taxation, international trade, security and border control, 
community development and justice. Practitioners’ views aligned well with the general thrust of the 
initial propositions drawn from the four cases and added additional insights. Interviewees were 
asked to reflect on the third research aim, examining what the centre can do to support the 
alternative ways of working they described. A focus group discussed overall themes and further 
considered centre support for effective experimentation and learning in policy implementation.  
 
The evidence from all of the above sources has been used to formulate the discussion of complex 
implementation and the lessons for New Zealand’s public management system that follows. 
 
Complex implementation 
It is widely appreciated that policy formulation should take account of a full range of 
implementation1
 
 variables—who is expected to do what, when, with whom, with which resources, 
and so on, and with what sorts of likely behavioural responses to those activities. Good policy design 
‘looks ahead’ to implementation and evaluation, thus collapsing analytical distinctions (McConnell, 
2010; Hill & Hupe, 2009). In addition, managers understand that there is often no one-way door to 
the world through which a formulated policy passes to be implemented. As policy activities play out, 
policy management iterations are influenced both by what is learned from evaluation and other 
feedback and what changes ensue from political directives. Policy analysis conducted inside the 
government agency and sensitive management practices may remain sufficient in situations where 
there is little debate about the track to be followed (McConnell, 2010). This research focused on the 
situations where traditional practices are insufficient—those in which both good ex ante policy 
analysis and continuous policy management processes are challenged due to the complexity of 
policy implementation. Recognising when the latter applies is not straightforward nor a matter of 
applying rules. 
In complex implementation, managers face several salient conditions:  
• A policy seeks to change or influence the behaviour of many independent actors 
(organisations, community groups and/or individuals) over whom there are no direct means 
of control. There is a range of activities, involving various agents, which could influence the 
overall policy outcome. 
                                                             
1 Hill and Hupe (2009) canvas a range of definitions of implementation (pp. 7–8), concluding with a preference 
for defining implementation as what happens between policy expectation and (perceived) results. We agree 
with this process-based characterisation, and not one in which there is first some policy which is then ‘carried 
out’. Moreover, policy and action are a continuum in the implementation process: paraphrasing Anderson 
(quoted in Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 7) policy is being made as it is implemented and implemented as it is made. 
Indeed, we are much attracted to the very broadest definition (as are Hill & Hupe), attributed to O’Toole, 
“performance via governance in the delivery of policy results”. Governance in this sense refers to “the way in 
which collective impacts are produced in a social system” (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 13).  
 
 
 
• The knowledge required to bring about the desired change is highly distributed in the 
communities, organisations and individuals where change is to take place and is unknowable 
at the point when policy decisions are being made. That is, there is no central node where 
knowledge considered necessary for well-controlled decisions can be mustered, made sense 
of and managed. 
• For functional necessity, policy actors simplify aspects of the situation; matters that are 
consequently overlooked become relevant and known only over time and through action,  
therefore adding to the management challenge.  
• Objectives may be clear only at the highest and most abstract level. Lower-level perceptions 
of the nature of the problem, appropriate elements of solutions and mandates may be 
contested.  
 
Conventional policy design and implementation remains effective in some situations, but often the 
sorts of conditions described above make it difficult to sufficiently anticipate what must be done to 
implement policy. Policy managers regularly lack the fundamentals that conventional practice 
guidance often assumes they can rely on, such as an adequate information base, clear role 
assignments, and predictable influence patterns, timeframes and milestones. Complex 
implementation situations call for a repertoire of practices that augment the extant practices of 
within-agency analysis and management. These practices would be: 
 
• Experimental: Policy implementation practised explicitly as experimentation, and public 
servants accorded appropriate latitude to learn from action. 
• Learning oriented: On-the-go learning arising from repeatedly searching for what does not 
fit the expected pattern followed by adapting actions to take into account new perspectives 
arising from plausible explanations about what is occurring. 
• Procedurally accountable: Policy implementers accountable for their experimentation and 
learning and for successive iterations of policy design, and for outcomes determined as a 
function of what emerges from the interaction between policy objectives, actors involved in 
implementation and context.  
• Collegial: Policy implementers would be able to learn from the work of others, to gradually 
build up an evidence base focused on complex policy implementation.  
 
The case studies offered signs that some policy practitioners are using these practices ahead of 
attempts to pin them down in any fully diagnostic sense. Thus, to aid better articulation of public 
management practitioners’ repertoire of practices, and to push against their boundaries, the 
conventional approach to policy making was contrasted with a new model, based on the literature 
studied and the case findings.   
 
In this stylised conceptualisation, two contrasting models of policy implementation were identified. 
Figure 1 assumes that policy design and implementation follow a linear, staged process (such as set 
out in Bardach, 2000), most of which occurs within the responsible government agency. Existing 
knowledge is marshalled and options are identified and compared, taking account of 
implementation requirements. A policy or programme is implemented outside of the originating 
agency, and is evaluated after some period. The evidence from evaluation may lead to further policy 
changes to be developed internally and implemented externally. The focus is on getting the policy 
‘right’ through the successive iterations. Figure 2 provides an alternative model, which adopts a 
pragmatic orientation to understanding a real-world problem.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Agency-Centred Model of Policy Design and Implementation 
 
Inside Government Agencies       In the ‘Real World’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the government sets broad objectives (as always), Figure 2 shows that more of the policy 
process occurs outside the government agency. The understanding of the problem formed through 
the traditional means of policy analysis is treated only as a tentative hypothesis which requires 
testing in the real world, outside of the government agency. Testing takes the form of actions with 
collaborators such as individuals, community groups and NGOs. These actions result in feedback that 
contributes to a review of the original policy hypothesis. As a result of the repeated iteration of this 
process, the policy design will be modified to retain those actions which produce changes towards 
the desired outcome, and to abandon actions that do not produce demonstrably good results. Thus 
the policy design is a work in progress, constantly adapted to take into account ongoing change 
occurring in the community. Different individuals with different experiences bring different 
perspectives to a situation. Over time, the perspectives shift through interaction. They interfere or 
reinforce others in a manner expected from complexity theory’s treatment of feedback loops. In this 
model, policy implementation and policy design occur together and both are constantly updated as 
learning occurs from doing.  
 
Figure 2: Experimental Model of Policy Design and Implementation 
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Moreover, this learning process depends on active collaborative arrangements involving a network 
of policy actors from within and outside of government in the absence of a comprehensive, logical 
plan that articulates the problem ex ante. As shown in pragmatism, beliefs, not evidence provide 
grounds for acting. The practitioners compare their beliefs with observed challenges to those beliefs. 
The pre-eminent disposition is the ability to see inconsistencies and to be surprised. The detection of 
the unexpected in the course of focused observation requires thinking and deeper probing to 
challenge existing understanding; surprise, and the genuine doubt it entails, sparks new questions 
and new ways of seeing that may lead to a refined hypothesis. Observed effects of actions targeting 
desired ends are used to update both what is desired and how those ends might be best pursued 
(Bromley, 2008).  
 
 
Characteristics of Complex Implementation 
Using the initial four case studies and the examples discussed by practitioners stimulated by the 
models in Figures 1 and 2, some broad themes emerged, which are pertinent to complex policy 
implementation. These are summarised in this section. Participant comments are italicised. 
Wicked problems 
Complex implementation is most often associated with wicked problems. These are problems where 
there are multiple perspectives on problem causes and solutions (e.g. family violence or school 
failure), there are no clear, unambiguous, and lasting solutions, and systemic responses are 
required. When government policy systems try to tackle such problems, no matter how thorough 
their analysis, there is likely to be as much unknown as known, and other actors, outside of 
government agencies, hold some of the information and expertise required for understanding of the 
problem and its solution. There may be less need for brand new interventions, but need for more 
flexible, adaptable, tailored uses of what is already available.  Even relatively simple problems, such 
as raising the GST rate, can be complex in their implementation because of the multitude of actors 
involved in the implementation and their different priorities. 
Government agencies can’t do it by themselves—they have to be in the outside world, 
everyone with a stake has to be taken seriously and the agency has to take all their 
stakeholders with them. 
 
A strong egalitarianism favours some implementation approaches, which can be most clearly 
appreciated in the reverse case occasioned by emergencies. In emergencies, actions cannot be 
thoroughly planned and cross-checked against various criteria and the environment exerts 
significant influence on what happens, for whom, and with inevitable ‘errors’. Even in the absence of 
a crisis, progress toward policy objectives may occur unevenly and in small bursts. Yet, small 
successes, as with the apparently one-off observations from crisis management, are difficult to 
embed sufficiently in practice expectations before activities revert to prior default settings. 
 
Clear vision and high-level goals 
A statement of vision, and the articulation of high-level goals, is an important first step in any 
complex implementation. Sometimes goals will not be agreed at the outset, and part of the 
implementation process must include reaching a shared agreement across all the relevant actors 
about what the goals should be. This, in turn, involves understanding the expectations created by 
the mandate outside of the government agency and understanding what might be involved in 
achieving the vision for different actors.  
 
 
 
 
Information is not knowledge. There is a need to understand the complexity of how 
others view the same information. 
Getting and keeping a mandate to work towards an outcome—this can come directly 
from government or more indirectly from ‘out there’ and people and businesses that see 
a problem that needs fixing. 
Networks of actors 
In complex implementation, there are networks of interdependent actors both inside and outside of 
government agencies, not all of whom will initially understand the vision/outcome. Some of these 
might have aligned interests and support the outcome, and some might not. Ignoring the latter 
could imperil the implementation. 
You have to get everyone at the table and they have to hear each other because that is 
part of the process of socialising the issue and building understanding that might lead to 
agreement on what needs to be done. 
Learning as you go 
A strategy for coping with complex implementation is to treat it as an experiment—a learning 
exercise—where each step in the implementation is an opportunity to gather more information, 
reassess assumptions and modify the implementation plan accordingly. 
[Peter] Senge had the right idea—you set a milestone you can see or that feels tangible 
enough to be achievable, and then when you get there you stop and assess things again 
before setting the next milestone. You can’t map it all out at the beginning because 
there is so much that you don’t know. 
I think it is the acceptance of the experiment—and not having to have everything 
planned and developed. If we had spent our time on intervention logic and stuck to that, 
we wouldn’t have been able to be as nimble. 
Sensemaking and reflection  
Complex implementation requires ongoing sensemaking (Weick, 1979) and deep reflection to 
unearth discrepancies between actual and intended or espoused practice by each of the actors. 
 
People do not always say what they mean/do; or mean/do what they say. 
 
I noticed [in the department] that when we got negative feedback, people went “oh we 
should control that!–shut it down!”. We resisted that. We listened to it. We didn’t shut it 
down. And we didn’t get completely rattled by it either. You can’t control that sort of 
thing. You have to work with it. 
 
Similarly, paradoxical ideas may be present in the field, and it can be better to work with them than 
to artificially resolve the paradox.  
 
One stakeholder argued for a more restrictive rule, but the underlying rationale turned 
on their interest in maintaining the maximum amount of flexibility.  
Knowledge gaps and untested ideas 
Even when there is a research and evidence base to draw on, there will be knowledge gaps, 
especially about local-level dynamics and how individuals, communities and organisations might 
 
 
 
respond to the policies being implemented. Therefore government agencies need to be more aware 
of what they do not know.   
 
Implementation actions might be seen as exploratory exercises to test tentative theories and ideas, 
and to ‘find out’. Even when a policy decision and its implementation appear simple, for example, 
“raise the GST rate from x to y at time t”, implementation is complex because the ideas the 
government agency might have about how this should be done are untested. Policy implementation 
can be prototyped and tested in real-world. ‘Policy design’ translates policy decisions into a working 
plan that will operate as intended in the real world, as opposed to theoretical model with unknown 
real-world performance. 
We spend a lot of time prototyping what the implementation might look like and then 
testing that against the real world. 
Our approach to implementation has changed completely. Where once upon a time, the 
implementation thinking did not really begin until the policy development was well 
down the track [Figure 3, diagram A], we now begin to design the implementation, hand 
in hand with the policy development, right from the outset [diagram B]. 
 
Figure 3: Time Profiles of Policy Development and Implementation 
A: the old model
B: the design model
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Anticipation of surprises 
Complex implementation results in unexpected interactions and results. Therefore, as well as a 
willingness to learn from what is occurring, attention is also needed to spot the emergence of 
phenomena and patterns of behaviour that were not intended. Such surprises should be expected 
and some of these will support and accelerated the intended trajectory of change.  
There are ways that we do things that create a whole that is greater than the sum of the 
parts. We are doing the opposite of what a conventional public servant might do. . . . . 
We had to believe that a point comes where you no longer have to drive everything. The 
ownership gets wider and the distributed network has taken over and driving it. . . . So 
 
 
 
many projects never get to that stage because public servants are afraid of 
stakeholders. They are risk averse. 
 
Where the patterns of behaviour that emerge undermine the intended direction of change, they 
need to be disrupted early before their effect comes to dominate the overall direction of change. 
You need to be collecting data about what happens during implementation and making 
it available in the policy community so that you are already thinking about the next 
[round of] review as you implement the changes.  
A promise to monitor the effects of what you do takes away the high stakes of change 
because if it looks like turning to custard you can do something about it before it is too 
late. 
Distributed information, decision making and accountability networks 
The information needed for implementation design and monitoring of implementation is highly 
distributed among actors, many of whom are outside government agencies. As independent decision 
makers, these actors will act according to their own interpretation of what is occurring and what 
they think is going to happen next. In this context, accountability for what happens is problematic. 
Government agencies need to be clearer about what they do and do not know and also what they 
are accountable for. In complex implementation this might take the form of evidence of change in 
the intended direction, rather than performance of specific actions. 
We teach problem definition and solution generation before you have even talked to 
people. And then we pick a solution, plan the design and then you implement it. That is 
just fine when you know what you are working with and there is high agreement about 
the problem and the solution. But where you have a high level of uncertainty about 
what works and how to grapple with it . . .  then the same old-same old will not work. 
We had to learn to chart a course and keep the navigation going and not lose sight of 
the goal.  
 
 
Supporting Factors 
Discussions with policy practitioners about their experiences in complex implementation resulted in 
identifying a range of factors that support an experimental approach to policy implementation. 
Among the lessons of experience were the following: 
 
• An experimenting approach to implementation requires both a mandate for a strategic goal 
and the permission to pursue that goal flexibly, learning from and adapting to new 
challenges.  
• Detailed plans and objectives have to be allowed to emerge through practice.  
• Planning for implementation needs to start early, alongside policy development. 
• Multiple types and sources of expertise are required. 
 
Complex implementation requires a base of skills and capabilities. Policy practitioners need 
relationship skills to interact with the diverse networks of individuals, organisations and 
communities which might hold some of the information and resources needed to achieve the policy 
goal and outcome. They need to be able to deal with ambiguity and changing situations without 
losing sight of strategic goals. They also need to be sufficiently flexible and nimble in their thinking 
and actions to take advantage of the serendipity that will arise during implementation. 
 
 
 
An experimenting, learning approach to complex policy implementation requires the support of 
evaluative findings. To provide a basis for learning and further policy development in complex and 
fluid implementation situations, evaluation approaches need to be flexible and attuned to the needs 
of key decision makers. Some recently developed evaluation approaches meet those needs. 
Developmental evaluation, as described by Patton (2011) provides one example of an evaluative 
approach that fits well with complex implementation. Developmental evaluation brings information 
to bear in support of an ongoing process of innovation and change. It suggests an ongoing process of 
dialogue with different stakeholders. In developmental evaluation, participants may ask not only 
what elements of the policy model have been implemented and why, but to what extent the original 
policy model remains appropriate and what new elements have been added to the model. Key 
questions for a developmental evaluation include: What issues have emerged? What unanticipated 
consequences have been observed? What has been learned about the implementation process? 
What factors have emerged as important for future policy development?  
 
Patton’s views on evaluation emphasise questioning, and thus align with a pragmatic mindset and 
the findings from this research. “Questioning is the ultimate method” (Patton, 2011, p. 288). The 
activity of questioning starts in situ (p. 229) becomes a means of intervention, of “questioning as we 
go” (p. 229), affecting not only the evaluation report but the very policy that is reported on. Thus, 
Patton privileges the role of the evaluation professional as part of the policy/implementation team. 
The evaluator is a facilitator and learning coach; a conduit bringing evaluative thinking practices to 
those in need of it; a “friendly critic” or a “burr in the saddle” (Patton, 2011, p. 25). 
 
 
Role of the Centre 
The ‘centre’ in this research was deliberately defined loosely at the outset. The findings suggest that 
there are at least five levels of centre, each of which can offer support in different and 
complementary ways:  
 
1. The chief executive and senior leadership of individual government agencies;  
2. Collectives of chief executives or deputy chief executives who adopt a 
leadership/championship role with respect to a particular outcome;  
3. The central agencies of State Services Commission, the Treasury and the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, which develop and monitor policies and guidelines affecting all 
government agencies;  
4. The ministerial executive of government which makes up the Cabinet; and  
5. Parliament and its machinery, such as select committees.  
 
Table 1 shows roles for each of these levels to support experimentation and learning in policy 
implementation.  
Table 1: Supporting actions for the centre 
Support required Support action  Action level 
Clear accountabilities The centre should hold people accountable for setting and 
holding to strategic goals, doing the initial policy 
development effectively, and learning from changed or 
emerging circumstances. 
1,2,3,4,5. 
Success framed in 
different terms on the 
basis of experience  
In the complex space where there are many actors, 
achievement of the outcome will involve a mutual adaptation 
between all the actors and therefore calls for flexibility in 
policy implementation to achieve more lasting community 
driven results.  
1,2,3,4,5 
 
 
 
Reduced reliance on 
steering groups as control 
and accountability 
mechanisms 
Steering groups may effectively monitor risk, but can also 
create a culture and practice of risk aversion. There is a need 
to overcome a tendency to ‘lock-in’ tentative, experimental 
actions to allow a ‘fast fail’ which learns and adapts from 
mistakes.  
1,2,3,4 
 ‘Tight’ focus on purpose 
and outcome but ‘loose’ 
focus on means 
Ministers, CEs and senior management need to be clear 
about the change they want. Policy designers need to provide 
flexibility in the means by which objectives can be achieved. 
Policy implementers need to invest in understanding the 
individuals, organisations and communities that have to be 
part of the change process and how they might actively 
support the change (as opposed to simply complying). 
2,3,4,5 
 ‘Champions’ groups at 
senior and influential 
levels 
Policy practitioners operating in complex implementation lack 
champions who understand the nature of the processes being 
created. Few of the current senior management group have 
experiential understanding of complex adaptive 
implementation processes. It was suggested that having CEs 
and deputy CEs ‘get their hands dirty’ by more direct 
involvement in a complex implementation might broaden 
capability in this respect at senior levels of the public service 
‘because they have some skin in the game’, i.e. a personal 
investment in achieving an outcome but not necessarily ’the’ 
outcome.  
1,2,3 
Organisational learning A deliberate intent and practice of learning from experience 
implementing policy is needed to enable the organisation to 
more fully and deeply understand its diverse client groups 
and their multiple perspectives and how this knowledge 
might inform future strategic thinking and planning by the 
organisation. Organisational learning implies an 
organisational memory—a capacity for retaining lessons of 
experience—as well as a culture shift from an expert 
orientation to that of learners.   
1,2,4 
Space for experiment and 
learning 
Complex policy implementation needs permission and the 
space and time to engage with actors who need to be part of 
the change. Allow for self-organisation of communities to 
occur around policy attractors and emergence of desirable 
behaviour to occur. Implementation planning needs to be 
able to adapt to allow these other actors to lead in places 
where this supports the policy objective. Policy 
implementation might be viewed more as a ‘new beginning’ 
than as a policy end. 
1,2,4 
Asking questions that 
might not have answers  
Ministers and chief executives should expect that there are 
some questions that cannot be answered at the time and that 
part of the process needs to be finding out more that will 
help make progress towards the policy objective.  Information 
on what is not known may be as valuable as information on 
what is known. 
1,2 
Recruitment of skills More diversity of skills is needed in policy development and 
implementation design. Ideally teams might become more 
transdisciplinary with individuals bringing more than one skill 
set and knowledge base to policy design. 
1, 3 
Development of capability A deliberate development of relationship and communication 
skills is needed to work in inter-organisational settings and 
with diverse values and cultures, along with analytical skills.  
1,3 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Complex and wicked problems require new ways of doing policy implementation. New ways of doing 
implementation entail  
 
• Collapsing the conventional distinction between policy design and implementation;  
• Augmenting the conventional model, in which policy is designed in-house along with a 
substantial implementation plan that is subsequently rolled out and managed, with a model 
in which policy/implementation is produced outside under the pervasive influence of the 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of the problem; 
• Adding an ongoing learning orientation to existing problem and outcome orientations, in 
which the locus of learning is out in the world (in the problem-solution-outcome context);  
• Redefining the objectives of policy evaluation by accepting that much of the knowledge that 
is necessary for the success of the policy emerges as part of policy/implementation practices 
and must be gained and applied on the fly; and 
• Developing a deliberate organisational learning perspective to evaluate and learn from 
practitioners’ experiences about a sector, its processes, and how outcomes are achieved 
during complex implementations. 
 
In short, successfully implementing policy for many policy problems is complex. It involves a whole 
system and multiple, open mechanisms that lead to emergent processes and outcomes, in a web of 
relationships and influences, almost all of which are not able to be controlled by the implementing 
agency. Aspects of implementation as a complex process may also apply to problems that are not 
themselves considered to be complex. 
 
Although policy analysts and advisors have little difficulty generating lists of things that might be 
done—some advisory service here, a social marketing campaign there, or a community partnership 
somewhere else—their existing theories and evidence about how and why policy ‘works’ serve as 
mere starting points, and the real work of design and implementation co-evolves in continuous 
contact with the changing nature and knowledge of the problem and the outcomes that are 
produced. This recognition requires a reframing of the role of the policy evaluator as a person who 
applies skills in presenting knowledge in context and to implementing and implemented-upon 
actors, getting alongside them and bringing them along. For implementers, a key implication is the 
need for experiment-conducive management systems and rules of accountability. 
 
In complex policy situations, characterised by large stakes and uncertainty, as well as in the everyday 
policy decisions that can have profound implications for individuals’ wellbeing, a strong case can be 
made for learning as we go. A renewed pragmatic practice brings experience into the many efforts 
to create the futures we want. Making use of evidence seamlessly requires applying continuously a 
habit of mind which asks not ‘what are the facts?’ but ‘what is the next question?’   
 
While the nature of complex problems and policy implementation means that there will never be a 
fully transparent and shared body of knowledge about what works to effect desired outcomes (nor 
stable ideas of what outcomes are possible), the public sector as a whole can seek to overcome 
three challenges: (1) that the initial efforts might not be as good as they could be because 
collaborative learning is limited; (2) that the lessons of experience are not made available to wider 
policy communities; and (3) that those who follow have to (re)discover the lessons of experience for 
themselves. Addressing these challenges requires policy designers/implementers to learn as they go 
and to allocate sufficient time to that learning, both as a share of time devoted to all policy tasks and 
as a new temporal rhythm in general. Successful complex policy-implementation requires a dogged 
focus on the future common good and a commitment to gradually work and talk our way there. 
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Appendix 1: Features of Complex Systems 
1. The system ‘whole’ 
Complex systems feature many interacting parts, with interdependent dynamism between them, 
such that the ‘whole’ cannot be understood as the sum of its parts, or reduced to its parts to assist 
understanding. This ‘whole’ behaves as a system. Individual humans and social groups of humans, 
formal (e.g. organisations) and informal groups, are complex systems (this and subsequent material 
draws from Eppel, 2010, and Eppel et al., submitted).  
 
2. Nested, interacting and interdependent systems 
Complex systems can be nested within larger and larger complex systems. Nested systems show 
‘self-similarity’ because the characteristics identified at one level of the system are also present in 
the ‘whole’. In order to understand the interdependence of these nested, interacting systems, a 
holistic view is needed. 
 
3. Adaptation and co-evolution within and between systems 
Over time, reflexive changes in one system lead to adaptations in interacting systems, and co-
evolution. From a complexity perspective, the ‘external’ environment is an interacting system. 
Therefore, changes in the environment may not only stimulate system change, but also external 
change in response. As a result, there is co-evolution and adaptation of a system and its 
environment.  
 
4. Change through self-organization and emergence 
Self-organization and emergence are features of complex social systems. Every change produces the 
stimulus for further change by self-reference to the internal state and adjustment to compensate 
internally and externally. Change in socio-economic systems occurs as a result of forces which act on 
the micro-diversity that emerges within the system as a result of feedback loops, adaptation, 
emergence. Emergence of new levels of order will occur through self-organization of system parts 
around ‘attractors’.  
 
5. Open systems and socially constructed boundaries 
Social systems are open to their environments and their boundaries are not constant or fixed. 
Boundaries are social constructs—artificial or socially imposed reference points—which define the 
limits of knowledge considered pertinent to the system and to the human agent who generates that 
knowledge. 
 
6. Multiple interactive systems, creating feedback mechanisms within and between systems 
Feedback loops are reflexive influence patterns, which arise from interaction between system parts. 
Negative feedback undoes or compensates for changes elsewhere, resulting in macro-stability. 
Internal features of organizations—such as structures, hierarchies, rules, controls, cultures, 
defensive routines, and power relations—are held in place by feedback loops locking an organization 
into a particular stable pattern (Morgan 1997). Positive feedback loops amplify changes by 
reinforcing the direction of change. They can cause sudden, unpredictable and destabilizing effects.  
 
7. Stability is not  equilibrium 
Despite a sometimes stable macro-appearance, complex systems are in fact ‘far-from-equilibrium’. 
Such systems can suddenly and unpredictably undergo changes at some critical ‘bifurcation point’. 
Far-from-equilibrium systems are often marked by tensions or paradoxes, as changes in the 
feedback loops destabilize the system and this change or instability can be disproportionate to the 
stimulus. At bifurcation points, new patterns can self-organize and emerge from the seemingly 
 
 
 
chaotic without external intervention. Social systems are both chaotic and stable depending on 
when one observes them.  
 
8. The history of the system influences its starting point for change 
System histories, starting points and feedback loops can create ‘path dependencies’. Stabilizing path 
dependencies arise when negative feedback loops undo externally imposed change or limit what 
happens next. Stable systems are more likely when there is a single, strong attractor influencing 
feedback loops. Less stable systems are characterized by multiple, weak attractors. Furthermore, the 
size, precise timing and nature of change in a complex system cannot be predicted in advance 
because of the sensitivity of the system to its initial starting position and contingency of the 
interactions between the system parts. 
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Appendix 2: Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is a philosophical framework that (amongst its tenets) views knowledge as both 
constructed and a function of organism-environment transactions; believes truth comes from 
experience; and is problem-solving and action-focused (Greene & Hall, 2010, p. 131). Pragmatists 
“live and act together” in a world “for which [they] have a shared responsibility” (see Biesta & 
Burbules, 2003, p. 108). Pragmatists see the “world as a place where things happen or they don’t . . . 
where progress is achieved by way of experimentation, trial and error. . . . pragmatism is a mind-set 
and a world view” (Harrison, 2009, p. 5).  
 
In pragmatism, knowing is about doing, not having. “When faced with new and unfamiliar choices, 
the process of learning precedes choice: we are forced to work out our beliefs about the situation as 
we contend with the situation” (Bromley, 2008, p. 5). Bromley argues that in a policy context, we 
must be able to offer reasons for beliefs about the outcomes of available options. Further, since the 
future is changing as we seek to go there, we reason to defeat this indeterminacy. This is not some 
specialist capability—it is an acknowledgement of how people in practice respond with reasoning, 
not calculation (Bromley, 2008, p. 4).  
 
Pragmatism suggests that all knowledge is fallible and that “individuals rearrange their 
perceptions/experiences to form new ideas” (Snider, 2000, p. 129). Knowledge is always open to 
additional interpretation. Its focus is on inquiry, its qualities and what the inquirer knows or does not 
know, not on knowledge as object. Inquiry, especially in Dewey’s formulation, rejects “a sharp 
dichotomy between theoretical judgements and practical judgements” (Hookway, 2008). We must, 
according to Stewart (1997), “be willing to test the consequences of our beliefs or explanations, 
particularly when doubt arises . . . [and] using human judgment rather than merely mechanical 
calculations, test [our] explanations and assumptions against those problems that [our] explanations 
and assumptions are supposed to solve (p. 21, emphasis in original).  
 
For Peirce, his ‘method of methods’ for acquiring and developing knowledge was “synonymous with 
the experimental method of the sciences” and indeed of learning in everyday life (Stewart, 1997, p. 
1). The process of questioning as we go implies integration between thinking, planning, trialling and 
objectives-setting, in which “thoughts about possible outcomes in the future are created once we 
find ourselves in the context of action: what should I do? We work out what we think we want as we 
work out what we think we might be able to have (to get)” (Bromley, 2008, p. 4). 
 
Inquiry is cumulative, as is learning throughout life. Peirce wrote that “reasoning should not form a 
chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, 
provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected” (quoted in Hookway, 2008). 
Mixed methods research develops cables of this sort when done well. Haack (2003) reinforces this 
point, claiming that “scientific evidence [is] a tightly interlocking mesh of reasons well-anchored in 
experience” (p. 3). In this alternative picture, ‘evidence’ is embedded in an extensive web, and is not 
universally ‘true’. 
 
Charles Beard, writing in the early 20th century, favoured “apolitical efficiency” (Snider, 2000, p. 
123), was concerned with “tangible consequences and with what works” (p. 134); was adamant that 
administration be stripped of any possible arbitrariness. As a consequence, administrators were 
required to adopt impersonal knowledge practices, and engaged social scientists as “technical 
servants to social administration . . . providing sheer methods and facts” (Dehue, 2001, p. 288). 
“Social scientists rapidly adapted to the new demands and began to focus on knowledge that was 
instrumental rather than reflexive, standardized rather than discretionary” (Dehue, 2001, pp 288-9).  
 
 
 
The pragmatic undercurrent suggests a coherence of inquiry that could move evidence-based policy 
making beyond its static rhetoric. Pragmatism may be said to have three key features as a method of 
inquiry (Stewart, 1997, p. 1). These features convey a progression from (1) discomfort/ problem/ 
need to act to (2) ‘hypothesis’ and its test, followed by (3) observation of consequences. Haworth 
notes further that “without (2) the blindness of the social process would be unmitigated. Without (3) 
there might be control, but there would be no assurance that the control was having the desired 
effect” (p. 34).  Some samples of this three-part progression are in Table A1. 
Table A1: Three features of pragmatism 
 Follett Stewart Haworth Briggs 
1 
We evolve a so-called 
common will 
identify the problem at 
hand. . . put the 
consequences of our 
beliefs or explanations 
under the light of doubt 
In order that social control 
may be realized, the 
capacity for defining 
goals, plans, and policies 
must be drawn upon, a 
capacity possessed only 
by human beings. But 
planning is only a first 
step in social control . . .  
Ideally, we need 
systems that are 
informed by evidence 
at each stage of policy 
development, from 
when an issue is first 
identified,  
2 
then we take it into 
the concrete world to 
see if it will work 
 
devise, using all the 
creativity you can muster, 
an explanation . . . that 
you believe might at least 
partially solve the problem 
In addition it is necessary 
that the plans be acted on 
or in some way put into 
effect, and 
to the development of 
the most appropriate 
response, 
3 
Insofar as it does 
work, it proves itself;  
insofar as it does not, 
it generates the 
necessary idea to 
make it “common” 
carefully and assiduously 
test your explanation . . . 
against the problem . . . 
and observe and record 
the results of this testing 
for errors 
it is subsequently 
necessary that the 
relation of the results with 
the desired social 
condition be discovered 
and subsequent 
evaluation of its 
effectiveness. 
Sources: Follett, (early public management theorist), 1918 (in Snider, 2000); Haworth, (political philosopher), 
1960, p. 34; Stewart, (philosopher), 1997, pp. 22-23; Briggs (senior public servant; foreword to Banks, 2009). 
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